fter a long and tortuous path of reform which had asted two decades, the Chinese political leadership embarked in September 1997 on a major breakthrough in state enterprise transformation. The 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) crossed a new threshold into the last stage of the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs): the transformation into modern corporations, including their total or partial privatisation. Now, with two years elapsed since this historic decision, the time has come to assess its first results. Scholars in China and abroad have devoted much of their time throughout the past couple of years to exploring the implementation of the programme set out by the 15th CCP Congress and discussing the effects of the measures taken. Some of the most recent literature in the English language, both in books and journals, has been provided by You Ji,' Edward S. Steinfeld, 2 Russell Smyth 3 and Yeh Chang-Mei. 4 These early assessments have adopted a critical stance on Chinese privatisation when addressing the two main facets of the CCP programme of "grasping the large and letting go the small" (zhua da, fang xiao). On the specific issue of privatisation of small and medium SOEs at the local level, Cao et al. s have recently provided a thorough study, which draws controversial conclusions with regard to the behaviour of local governments in the privatisation process.
The present article will attempt to summarise the main conclusions reached by Cao et al. and confront them with evidence provided by previous authors and other information sources from mainland China. Firstly, we will provide a brief examination of the progress of privatisation of small and medium-sized SOEs in China. Secondly, by analysing the incentives * University of Barcelona, Spain.
INTERECONOMICS, May/June 2000 of provinces and localities to privatise SOEs, the article will cast doubts on the optimistic view shared by Cao and his co-writers. Thirdly, a new set of incentives will be used to describe the behaviour of local authorities in China, which challenges the arguments given by Cao et al. Finally, a brief critique of the whole privatisation process will be presented. Whereas Western critique is too often restricted to the discussion on corporate governance, we will here emphasise the need for additional reforms, which indirectly affect the course and outcome of state enterprise reform. These profound reforms are critical to the entire transition process in China, as evidence in Eastern Europe has shown.
Progress of Privatisation at the Local Level
The 15th CCP Congress endorsed the process of enterprise transformation at the local leveP which had actually been going on in China since the late 1980s. During the implementation of the Contract Responsibility System (CRS), local governments at all levels expanded their control over SOEs by investing in the 6 Unless otherwise indicated, the term "local" refers in the following to all administrative levels below the centre which hold property rights over SOEs, i.e. provinces/regions, cities, counties and townships.
REPORT firms and sharing power with managers. 7 Thus, a pattern of de facto property rights emerged, which was officially recognised by the central government in the 15th CCP Congress strategy of "letting go the small" (fang xiao). As many as 66,000 industrial SOEs fall under the control of provinces and lower administrative levels, 8 counties and townships being the major "owners" in rural areas, whereas cities play this role in more urbanised regions. Provinces and autonomous regions hold control over a smaller number of enterprises of larger size, frequently of similar dimensions to their national counterparts.
The final stage of enterprise reform at the local level implies the corporatisation of enterprises through the issuance of shares and total or partial privatisation. Enterprises take either one of the corporate forms contained in the new Company Law (limited liability or joint-stock company), or the form of a shareholding cooperative, a hybrid corporate form close to Western cooperatives. In other cases, enterprises are directly sold off to private investors or kept in state hands as wholly state-owned companies. According to Cao et al., corporatisation and direct sales account for more than half of all privatisation cases at county level. In a survey of several provinces, 35% of all small and medium SOEs at the local level (county and city) chose to become shareholding cooperatives through privatisation, with this share reaching 50% in Shandong and 80% in Jiangsu? In a global perspective, privatisation at the county and township levels has progressed rapidly in the past couple of years. By the end of 1996, up to 70% of small SOEs had been privatised in pioneering counties such as Yibin of Sichuan, Shunde of Guangdong and Zhucheng of Shandong. Although Chinese official statistics do not reflect the full extent of the transformation, because privatised firms may still be recorded as SOEs or take different corporate forms, some estimations take the end of 1998 as a turning point when most SOEs at county level should already be regarded as "gone". 1~ In the meantime, reform has spread inland from the pioneering southern coastal regions. By 1994, about 24% of all shareholding enterprises (including shareholding cooperatives) were located in the central or western parts of the country," while the northern province of Heilongjiang, home to one of the highest concentrations of SOEs, had privatised 91.4% of all its county-level state firms by mid-1996.12 Privatisation at higher administrative levels has progressed at a slower pace. The larger size of the firms and the need for deep restructuring, if existing jobs are to be saved, have called for a more cautious approach in cities and provinces. Large profitable provincial and city-owned enterprises have been partially privatised through stock issuance, both on Chinese domestic markets and abroad. In Hong Kong, for example, among 34 listed companies from the mainland (H-shares), we find the city-controlled Beiren Printing Machinery and the provincial Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical? 3 In many other cases, however, city and regional governments have to save ailing firms through the implementation of restructuring plans. Besides the classical Shanghai model of financing enterprise restructuring through the auctioning of land-use rights, TM Cao et al. briefly describe alternative efforts undertaken by Heilongjiang province in this respect? 5 Across the country, local governments invest fresh capital in former SOEs, partially or totally privatised, in order to improve their financial situation. These funds come in most cases from the issuance and sate of enterprise shares, i.e. from privatisation itself? 6 Cao et al. stress the fact that privatisation in China has not been a widespread free distribution of shares, as occurred in Eastern Europe and Russia, but high private savings have allowed real share prices to be paid. 17 Yet, except for the former case of reinvestment of privatisation proceeds, the authors do not discuss in detail the use of such funds by local authorities.
Incentives of Local Governments
Following previous work on the impact of decentralisation on the budget constraint of local governments, la Cao et al, present fiscal federalism as the
